4👑☸ Cattāri Ariya-saccaṃ 四聖諦
B. Analayo's vitakka and vicāra
Bhikkhu Anālayo on V&V and Jhāna
* His definition of vitakka in Buddhism Enclopedia
* His book: EBMS (Early Buddhist Meditation Studies) covers vitakka and jhāna
can be found here:
https://archive.org/details/Lucid24VitakkaAndVicara
He has translated V&V from pali, chinese, sanskrit, and he translates them similarly.
(from chinese agama) [directed] awareness and [sustained] contemplation
✅ ☸EBT V&V💭: vitakka & vicāra = directed-thought & evaluation
⛔ Vism. Redefinition V&V💭: applied-thought & sustained-thought (b.nanamoli)
⛔ Vism. Redefinition V&V💭: initial-application & sustained-application (u thittila)
⛔ B.Sujato mistranslation of V&V💭: placing-the-mind & keeping-it-connected
⛔ B.Anālayo mistranslation of V&V💭: [directed] awareness and [sustained] contemplation
Prologue
There is a pernicious misunderstanding perpetrated by late Theravada, late Abhidhamma & Vism., and unfortunately a very common view popular nowadays that Vitakka and Vicara in first jhāna is something entirely different. By doing detailed Pali+English audits, hopefully in my life time we can wipe out this misunderstanding. All the EBT evidence supports the interpretation above. If you trace the EBT passages themselves, and even early Abhidhamma’s Vibhanga definition of V&V, through KN Pe, Vimuttimagga, they consistently support the EBT position above.
It’s only in later Abhidhamma, where they were beholden to their ideas of momentariness that they found it necessary to redefine jhāna, kāya, sukha vedana, V&V in first jhāna, among other things.
⛔Vism. Redefinition of V&V for 4 jhānas:
“[As for] applied thought, hitting upon is what is meant. It has the characteristic of directing the mind onto an object. It is manifested as the leading of the mind onto an object. [As for] sustained thought, continued sustainment is what is meant. It has the characteristic of continued pressure on the object. It is manifested as keeping consciousness anchored on that object.”—the Vism, IV
Wait, I thought Bhante Sujato and B.Analayo were on the side of the EBT?
⛔Bhante Sujato's translation of V&V:
Vitakka = placing the mind,
Vicāra = keeping the mind connected
B. Sujato’s translation seems to be an elegant and easier to comprehend version of Visuddhimagga’s redefinition of V&V for first jhāna. Note Vism. has created an “access concentration” that doesn’t violate V&V in the sense of “thinking and pondering”. But there is no access concentration in EBT. What gives here? You’ll have to ask Bhante Sujato. I’m an optimist and think that he will at some point review all the mountains of evidence in the EBT and change his translation to something more along the lines of what every other English translator who follows the EBT interpretation. But if doesn’t, hopefully he will at least show the EBT that supports his interpretation, and how he arrived at that conclusion.
If you look a the Abhidhamma Vb definition of V&V, KN Pe, Vimuttimagga (listed in chronological order there), you’ll see the similes and definitions they use for V&V are very consistent with the EBT. It’s only 900 years later in Vism. (500 yr after Vimt.) where they make radical and inappropriate changes. I’ve basically gone through the works listed above with detailed pali/english translation so you can confirm for yourself in pali how the EBT meaning gets corrupted in late Theravada.
Basic concepts
case study MN 128 🍒 cherry pickers galore, the four jhānas are not mentioned, ♾️🦆
🍒 cherry picking
cher·ry-pick·ing
noun: cherry-picking;
the action or practice of choosing and taking only the most beneficial or profitable items, opportunities, etc., from what is available.
"it is an exaggeration based on the cherry-picking of facts"
The 🍒 cherry picking strategy is abused frequently along with confirmation bias and narrative fallacy. Basically, one has a preconceived notion, an agenda, or biased view. For example:
Since stream entry could be attained with First jhāna, first jhāna must be a very difficult practice, and (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation, must be more subtle and fundamentally different than ordinary thinking.
Then reading through the suttas, MN 128 in this case, we look for evidence to support our agenda (confirmation bias), quote out of context, quote selectively to support our agenda (🍒 cherry picking). And if the evidence doesn't quite fit, we distort and twist it until it can appear to fit, like the bed of Procustes*.
In the case of MN 128, the four jhānas are not mentioned. And instead of 5 hindrances, there are 11 upa-kilesas (defilments). The sutta instead works with 3 ways of samādhi, which are in fact another way of mapping out the four jhānas. But an important point needs to be made here. When Bhikkhu Anālayo, Bhikkhu Sujato, Ajahn Brahm need samādhi to be four jhānas, then they call it four jhānas. In other contexts, when the samādhi is obviously also jhāna quality like it is here, then they say, "it's a samādhi that is lower than four jhāna quality". This is cherry picking, inconsistent application of samādhi standard, confirmation bias, and intellectual dishonesty. In trying to find evidence in the EBT to support their view of Jhāna, they employ these strategies often. And in the long debate between Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu and Bhikkhu Anālayo on Bhikkhuni ordination, Bhikkhu Anālayo does this in abundance. I didn't follow the whole debate and read all of their back and forth essays, but I read enough of it (very carefully), and looked at some of the pāḷi text to verify some of their claims, enough to see Bhikkhu Anālayo uses the same bag of intellectually dishonest strategies as he does in gathering evidence from the EBT to support his view on jhāna.
♾️🦆 Infinite Duck Dilemma
If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, waddles like a duck, it's jhāna!
Unless you're Bhikkhu Anālayo or Bhikkhu Sujato, and you need the evidence to say something else. When you need samādhi to be four jhānas, then you call it four jhānas. If you need to show the samādhi is less than four jhānas, then it's just a bird species that looks incredibly similar to a duck, quacks like a duck, etc., but is not actually a duck.
So what happens you when cherry pick ducks and call them ducks, and label all the other ducks not-ducks? You have an infinite Duck Dilemma. And you've destroyed the integrity and coherence of the suttas in the EBT, making it impossible to interpret and understand the meaning of the EBT if they apply your arbitrary cherry picking way of interpreting text consistently across the rest of the teaching.
🛏️ Bed of Procrustes
In Greek mythology, Procrustes (Ancient Greek: Προκρούστης Prokroustes) or "the stretcher [who hammers out the metal]", also known as Prokoptas or Damastes (Δαμαστής, "subduer"), was a rogue smith and bandit from Attica who attacked people by stretching them or cutting off their legs, so as to force them to fit the size of an iron bed.
Intellectual dishonesty
(from wikipedia)
Intellectual honesty is an applied method of problem solving, characterized by an unbiased, honest attitude, which can be demonstrated in a number of different ways:
One's personal faith does not interfere with the pursuit of truth;
Relevant facts and information are not purposefully omitted even when such things may contradict one's hypothesis;
Facts are presented in an unbiased manner, and not twisted to give misleading impressions or to support one view over another;
References, or earlier work, are acknowledged where possible, and plagiarism is avoided.
Harvard ethicist Louis M. Guenin describes the "kernel" of intellectual honesty to be "a virtuous disposition to eschew deception when given an incentive for deception".[1]
Intentionally committed fallacies in debates and reasoning are called intellectual dishonesty.
Occam's razor
Occam's razor (also Ockham's razor or Ocham's razor (Latin: novacula Occami); further known as the law of parsimony (Latin: lex parsimoniae) is the problem-solving principle that essentially states that simpler solutions are more likely to be correct than complex ones.
narrative fallacy
MN 128, SN 40.1 Even gifted meditators supposedly needed Buddha’s help
Bhikkhu Anālayo EBMS MN 128 comment:
For evaluating the meaning of vitakka appropriate to the first
absorption, the Upakkilesa-sutta and its parallels can be consulted, which report the Buddha’s own struggle through various
mental obstructions before he was able to attain even just the
first absorption. The same discourse indicates that Anuruddha
experienced similar difficulties; in fact the Buddha relates his
own struggle precisely to help Anuruddha and his friends to
deepen their concentration.39 This is noteworthy in view of the
fact that, according to the canonical listings of eminent disciples, Anuruddha excelled all other monk disciples of the Buddha in the exercise of the divine eye and thereby in an ability
that requires considerable concentrative mastery.40 For him to
have needed the Buddha’s personal intervention to attain just
the first absorption,
and for the Buddha on that occasion to relate his own difficulties in this respect, implies that already the
first absorption involves a level of concentration that requires a
considerable amount of meditation practice and expertise, even
in the case of gifted practitioners
This is at best fanciful speculation. Bhikkhu Anālayo's reasoning process is fatally flawed with narrative fallacy and confirmation bias.
The narrative fallacy is, in evaluating events in hindsight, attributing cause and effect relationships where none is justified. But because humans like to reframe the past and search for insight by using a nice story ('narrative'), we often fool ourselves with this device.
Confirmation bias, is a tendency to distort our perception of evidence to conform to our previously held beliefs and biases. Bhikkhu Anālayo does plenty of that in EBMS and his analysis of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation in various articles and books.
For MN 128 and SN 40, his reasoning is that, since Moggallana and Anuruddha are two of the greatest meditators in Buddhist history, and they needed the Buddha's assistance to attain first jhāna, therefore first jhāna must be very difficult to attain, and (V&V💭) must be a very subtle more advanced process than ordinary thinking.
We can quickly see the fallacy of this reasoning with a single example. In AN 7.61, the same mighty Moggallana, while practicing samādhi, is overcome with drowsiness. The Buddha comes over to give advice and help him with 7 strategies to overcome drowsiness. Using Bhikkhu Anālayo's reasoning, since Moggallana needed Buddha's assistance, therefore overcoming drowsiness is something far beyond ordinary experience and extraordinarily difficult, requiring the Buddha's assistance. And since Mogallana is one of the mightiest meditators of all time, therefore overcoming drowsiness is an advanced practice.
vipassana is performed during four jhānas
MN 111 circular reasoning, lateness of sutta irrelevant
Bhikkhu Anālayo EBMS:
Nevertheless, in what follows I will take a closer look at the
Anupada-sutta to see if the discourse, even if it should only
reflect later ideas of its Theravāda reciters, does imply that insight into impermanence is to be practiced while one is immersed in an absorption. Here is the description of the insight
contemplation undertaken by Sāriputta in relation to the first
absorption (leaving the factor vitakka without translation for
the time being, as I will discuss its significance later on):
The states in the first absorption were determined by him
one by one: vitakka, [sustained] application, joy, happiness,
mental unification, contact, feeling, perception, volition,
mind,22 desire, determination, energy, mindfulness, equipoise, and attention. Known these states arise, known they
remain, known they disappear.
He understood thus: ‘Indeed, in this way these states,
which have not been, come into being; having been, they
disappear.’
Not being in favor of or against these states, he dwelled
being independent, without being bound to them, being
freed from them, being released from them, with a mind
that is without confines. He understood: ‘There is an escape
beyond this.’23
According to the above description in the Anupada-sutta,
“known these states arise, known they remain, known they disappear”, viditā uppajjanti, viditā upaṭṭhahanti, viditā abbhatthaṃ gacchanti. This provides an important indication for a
proper appreciation of the discourse, which clearly depicts a
mode of contemplation where Sāriputta is aware of these states
arising and, after they have remained for a while, he is also
aware when they disappear.
To cultivate such awareness of these mental qualities arising
and disappearing while being in an absorption is impossible,
because the very presence of these qualities is required for
there to be an absorption in the first place and for it to continue
being a state of absorption.24
The formulation used in the discourse makes it clear that
the passage does not intend to refer to the momentary change
of mental qualities. The Anupada-sutta clearly specifies that
Sāriputta observes the arising of mental qualities which “have
not been, come into being”, ahutvā sambhonti, and he contemplates their disappearance when “having been, they disappear”,
hutvā paṭiventi.25 The notion of momentariness, according to
which phenomena pass away on the spot at every moment, is
in fact a relatively late development in Buddhist thought.26 It
can safely be set aside as not forming the backdrop of the early
discourses.
So when these states have not yet come into being or disappear, a practitioner inevitably is not yet or no longer in the absorption, simply because the absorption lasts only as long as
all of the mental qualities that characterize it are fully present.
Therefore to observe the arising of these mental qualities and
their disappearance could only happen before an absorption is
attained or after the attainment has come to an end.
Several fallacies here. First, the circular reasoning highlighted is astounding.
Even a novice understands the concept, it's hard to believe Bhikkhu Anālayo is committing
that offense by accident or through incompetence. Since MN 111 is a particularly strong
case against his understanding of jhāna and (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation, there is strong motive here to disprove it by any means necessary. It's hard to believe the circular reasoning was not done intentionally, which would mean this is also an act of intellectual dishonesty.
Red herring: Second, the lateness of the Sutta, which he mentions several times even in just that short passage quoted, in an attempt to discredit the validty of the sutta, is not relevant. The relevant part of the sutta text, involving the "vidita vitakka uppajjanti" (known are vitakka as they arise), is part of the EBT (Early Buddhist Texts) standard definition of
(S&S🐘💭) sati & sam-pajāno, remembering & lucid-discerning.
(S&S🐘💭) is baked into the standard formula for third jhāna and fourth jhāna.
In fact, I've pointed this fact out many times to Bhikkhu Sujato and Bhikkhu Anālayo in public forums which they actively participated at that time. I did not receive a response from them, so theoretically it's possible they did not read my message. But more likely, it's just a strategy to maintain plausible deniability. But even if we assume they truly did not see my messsages, the standard definition for (S&S🐘💭) sati & sam-pajāno, remembering & lucid-discerning is well known (see AN 4.41), as is the ubiquitous standard third jhāna formula. To not be aware of that, for professional EBT experts, would be gross negligence or incompetence, which is highly unlikely.
The circular reasoning Bhikkhu Anālayo uses is this:
He tries to redefine what absorption means (different than third jhāna for example), and then "prove" that the vipassana while in jhāna is impossible because to perceive a change in phenomena would break the state of absorption. This is circular. What he needs to prove (and he never does, because the evidence does not exist), with evidence from the EBT, is that absorption is as he tries to redefine it. He simply concludes that first jhāna can't be an absorption because it doesn't meet his redefinition of absorption. That is not proof. That is using an unproven assumption as the conclusion.
Circular reasoning
(wikipedia) (Latin: circulus in probando, "circle in proving";[1] also known as circular logic) is a logical fallacy in which the reasoner begins with what they are trying to end with.[2] The components of a circular argument are often logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Circular reasoning is not a formal logical fallacy but a pragmatic defect in an argument whereby the premises are just as much in need of proof or evidence as the conclusion, and as a consequence the argument fails to persuade. Other ways to express this are that there is no reason to accept the premises unless one already believes the conclusion, or that the premises provide no independent ground or evidence for the conclusion.
Examples of Circular Reasoning: The Bible is true, so you should not doubt the Word of God.
Red herring
(From Wikipedia)
A red herring is something that misleads or distracts from a relevant or important issue.[1] It may be either a logical fallacy or a literary device that leads readers or audiences towards a false conclusion. A red herring might be intentionally used, such as in mystery fiction or as part of rhetorical strategies (e.g., in politics), or it could be inadvertently used during argumentation.
The term was popularized in 1807 by English polemicist William Cobbett, who told a story of having used a kipper (a strong-smelling smoked fish) to divert hounds from chasing a hare.
many other suttas where vipassana is explicitly performed in jhāna
MN 111 is the most famous and detailed case of
vipassana being done while in the four jhānas or 7 of the 9 attainments.
There are also many other suttas where that's explicitly stated.
Why do you think Bhikkhu Anālayo doesn't talk about them? (I didn't read the entire EBMS book, but the part near MN 111 and jhāna relevant issues I read carefully).
We can presume if he did mention them, he would simply apply the same fallacious circular reasoning argument as in MN 111.
But most likely he didn't mention them because he can't dismiss them all as late suttas, potentially
inauthentic suttas. So by deliberately not acknowledging these suttas, he is setting us up with a biased sample fallacy, an act of intellectual dishonesty.
There are many other suttas where vipassana is explicitly performed in jhāna and samādhi attainments, such as most of the
suttas in this list, which is every sutta that contains the matching phrase:
nirvana, sabba saṅkhāra samatho
AN 3.32 nirvana, experienced within samādhi
AN 4.114 simile of king's bull elephant, 4pd -> nirvana
AN 4.124 11 ways insight while in 4 jhānas, rebirth in pure abode
AN 5.140 same as AN 4.114 simile of king's bull elephant, 4pd -> nirvana
AN 9.36, nirvana experienced within 4 jhānas, 3 formless perception attainments
AN 10.6 similar to AN 3.32 nirvana, experienced within samādhi, but is not 9 samapatti
AN 10.60 nirvana formula without the nirvana part, for perception of nirodha and viraga
AN 11.7 same as AN 10.6, nirvana, experienced within samādhi, but is not 9 samapatti
AN 11.8, almost same as AN 11.7, but expressed as attention instead of samaadhi perception
AN 11.18 like AN 11.7, but monks ask question instead of ananda
AN 11.19 like AN 11.7, but monks ask question instead of ananda
AN 11.20 like AN 11.8, but monks ask sariputta instead of ananda
AN 11.21 like AN 11.8, but monks ask sariputta instead of ananda
DN 14, 12ps like MN 26
MN 26 12ps
MN 64, like AN 9.36, nirvana experienced within 4 jhānas, 3 formless perception attainments
MN 85, 12ps like MN 26
SN 6.1 brahma’s reqeust, 12ps like MN 26
SN48.50 samsara without beginning, works in 5ind, allude to 12ps
William Chu commented on my MN 111 blog post:
Analayo's argument here indeed is tenuous.
First, the lateness of MN111 is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Second, to argue that MN111 has Abhidhammic elements is actually defeating his own purpose: late Abhidhamma has a tendency to posit that, since every moment of consciousness can only take up one single object, jhana (as a mental object) cannot coexist with another object (e.g. intention, energy, contact, and the other factors that MN111 lists). It is very odd that, if MN111 indeed is influenced by Abhidhamma reasoning, it would go against a very common late Abhidhamma assumption, which is to posit that jhana is a kind of singular absorption/trance that does not allow for reflection!
Third, MN111 is hardly the only sutta that talks about insight in jhana. Its position that jhanas contain both calm and insight is the rule rather than the exception in the early Buddhist canon.
MN 117 is late Abhidhamma, why no mention?
MN 117 understanding Survivorship bias
also bandwagon effect, herd mentality
Before we can dive in and audit how and why Bhikkhu Anālayo scrupuluously avoids talking about MN 117 while making his case for their redefinition of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation, first we need to understand the concept of survivorship bias, so we can avoid that bias while evaluating the evidence and see what's actually going on.
Survivorship bias
(wikipedia) Survivorship bias or survival bias is the logical error of concentrating on the people or things that made it past some selection process and overlooking those that did not, typically because of their lack of visibility. This can lead to false conclusions in several different ways. It is a form of selection bias.
example 1: B. Sujato smuggles his V&V definition into MN 117. Why?
I’m guessing B. Sujato feels like it appears justifiable to include “placing the mind” under the MN 117 definition of right resolve because Abhidhamma already greased the tracks with those new meanings for vitakka and “placing the mind” doesn’t look out of place in that company.
Unfortunately this is survivorship bias. The survivors write the history books, and dictate what’s popular and commonly believed. Vism.'s views are still popular, so it’s very easy to leverage those views to support ones own.
example 2: Buddha was a straight shooter, not a conniving fork tongued trickster
(excerpts from various posts of mine)
In the Theravada world there’s a survivorship bias going on. The survivors write the history books, and people believe their interpretation of jhana. It’s heartening to learn about the different lineages that retained a straightforward common sense reading of the Buddha’s words. I’ve always believed the Buddha was a straight shooter and a plain speaker, not someone who deviously used common words and actually meant something very esoteric and obscure, requiring the Theravda orthodoxy to explain the secret code.
...
And don’t forget the survivorship bias westerners are all subjected to. Survivors write the history books. Just because you happen to move in Burmese Theravada circles, and think that’s an accurate representation of Early Buddhist teachings, you really have to do your homework and compare the difference between Vism., Vimt., early Abhidhamma such as the Vibhanga, etc. to see the important differences.
Another EBT school, the sarvastivada school, seen in the Agamas in SA and MA, if you look at their position on jhana, it’s very consistent with Ajahn Lee, Thanissaro, Bhante G, early Theravada, Arahant upatissa in Vimt, etc.
example 3: jhana, ajahn brahm also leverages Vism. having already established view of jhana
Later Theravada, Vism. and later abhidhamma, redefine jhana, kaya, vedana into something completely different. Unfortunately there is survivorship bias effect going on, with Vism. being a popular work, people regard it as authoritative, and most people have no clue why, how, or that it contradicts the EBT (pali, agamas, etc…) on this point.
...
And if you study the standard 4th jhana formula and infinite space (samadhi attainment #5) formulas very carefully, word by word, it makes it very clear that kāya and rūpa from the 4 jhanas are referring to the physical body of flesh and blood.
It’s all actually plainly stated, unambiguous in the EBT. That’s why Vism. has to use brute force to redefine kāya.
But since Ajahn Brahm can not use Vism. officially as a supporting reason, he has to mutilate the meaning of “vivicceva kamehi” from the first jhana formula to justify his claim. No one in the EBT world other than Ajahn Brahm and his supporters buy that argument.
Ajahn Brahm and the robes
(This parable takes place in a fictional world where sarvastivada was the survivor and dominant view of early buddhism instead of theravada)
A large crowd gathered to hear a talk from the famous EBT Buddhist Monk Ajahn Brahm.
And then Ajahn Brahm explained the body does not actually mean the physical body, but a collection of mental aggregates. And vitakka doesn't actually mean thinking, for one can not think while in jhana.
There was an uncomfortable silence mixed with gasps of shock. For no one dared question the wisdom of Ajahn Brahm. Then an innocent young child shouted out, "Ajahn Brahm isn't wearing robes!"
(the child was expecting Ajahn Brahm to wear the robes of an EBT Buddhist Monk, not some other type of clothing, like a birthday suit)
The real story
BBhikkhu Anālayo, can not provide evidence from the EBT to support his redefinition of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation in the four jhānas. So he has to resort to fallacious arguments. The reason you don't hear him talk about MN 117 when it comes time to make his case for redefinition, is because MN 117 is a late sutta, where the right resolve/vitakka being defined is almost exactly the same as Abhidhamma Vibhanga jhāna section definition. He won't want to draw undue attention to the fact that he can't actually provide evidence from the EBT to support his claim. He relies on the results of MN 117, Abhidhamma, for the only scriptural backing. But since is purportedly pro EBT, he has to manufacture fallacious arguments since no evidence from EBT exists to back his claim.
And the reason they're getting away with it is because they're riding the coattails of Vism. and Abhidhamma on this, taking advantage of survivorship bias, bandwagon effect. Their Theravadan audience has already been inculcated with VRJ (Vism. Re-definition of Jhāna), so it's not hard to use some smoke and mirrors and fallacious arguments instead of EBT evidence, to convince them that EBT jhāna and (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation is the same as VRJ (Vism. Re-definition of Jhāna).
This is herd mentality and blind faith in authority figures (Bhikkhu Sujato, Bhikkhu Anālayo, Ajahn Brahm (Brahmavamso)).
What the audience should be doing is questioning authority, looking at the EBT to verify what their teachers say.
So why no references to MN 117 in EBMS?
So why are references to MN 117 missing in Bhikkhu Anālayo's EBMS?
Bhikkhu Anālayo's (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra enclopedia entry:
The solution to this conundrum can be found with the help of the (MN 117) Mahācattārīsaka, which in a list of near synonyms for right intention includes "application of the mind", cetaso abhiniropanā, alongside vitakka. This indicates that the range of meaning of vitakka goes beyond conceptual thought as such, covering also the sense of an inclination of the mind. Both nuances of vitakka are in fact closely related to each other, since to reflect or think on something requires an inclination of the mind towards the topic or issue at hand.
B. Anālayo (Madhyama-āgama Studies) on MN 117
“Closer scrutiny of the discourse itself shows that some of the pāḷi terms used in the Mahacattarasaka-sutta’s definition of supra-mundane right intention , such as “fixing” (appanā) of the mind and “mental inclination” (cetaso abhiniropanā), are not found in other discourses and belong to the type of language used only in the Abhidharma and historically later pāḷi texts.”
(presumably this was written after the encyclopedia entry which I don't have a date for)
So why are references to MN 117 missing in Bhikkhu Anālayo's EBMS?
EBMS: searching for 'MN 117', 'mn 117', 'Mahācattārīsak' in the PDF file for this book returns no results. I didn't read the entire book and all the footnotes, but I did read the section on jhāna, and vitakka carefully.
We can see at the time he wrote the encyclopedia entry, Bhikkhu Anālayo was relying on MN 117 to justify his mistranslation of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation to mean something nearly identical to VRJ (Vism. Re-definition of Jhāna).
Then at the time he did the MA Studies, he realized the MN 117 passage he relied on was Abhidhamma.
So we can deduce he probably figured out it was a bad idea for someone who claims to champion EBT to rely on late Abhdhamma text, even indirectly. But why does he not mention this in EBMS? Probably because he doesn't want to draw attention to the fact that there is no EBT text that supports his redefinition of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, and he doesn't want people to ask the obvious questions, like:
1) why do you have to use invalid circular reasoning (MN 111)?
2) narrative fallacy (MN 128, "first jhāna is so hard even Anuruddha needed the Buddha's help") to explain the need to redefine (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation.
3) and why this funny coincidence that your redefinition of (V&V💭) resembles VRJ (Vism. Re-definition of Jhāna)?
4) and since VRJ (Vism. Re-definition of Jhāna) had to resort to brute force tactics, writing new scripture to override and redefine the key jhāna terms to suit their agenda (see separate dedicated article auditing exactly how they corrupt the text and change things from early Abhidhamma through Vimutti-magga, and Visuddhi-magga).
In other words, if Vism.'s author, Buddhaghosa, such a highly regarded scholar monk, with a large team of scholar monk experts, did not find evidence in the EBT to support his VRJ (Vism. Re-definition of Jhāna), and had to amend Buddhist doctrine by creating an access concentration, redefine kāya(body), redefine sukha vedana, redefine (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, how is that a single person, Bhikkhu Anālayo, was able to find evidence that a large team of specialized experts could not?
Combine that information with how fatally flawed Bhikkhu Anālayo's reasoning process is in MN 111, even a reader who doesn't understand all of these technical details should be able to see Bhikkhu Anālayo's arguments in an attempt to redefine (V&V💭) are not convincing.
This is why Bhikkhu Anālayo is very quiet and tries not to bring up MN 117 when he discuss (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation. They're also both very quiet on MN 78. At least Bhikkhu Sujato is in his published comments on (V&V💭) . It's too late for Bhikkhu Anālayo, he's already published too much on MN 78 and it's MA parallel that leave an audit trail that one can safely and confidently deduce he is being intellectually dishonest in not talking about MN 78 in EBMS. Like MN 111, and MN 125, MN 78 is one of the strongest pieces of evidence in favor of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, defined as the common sense straightforward thinking & evaluation.
But even if they try to use MN 117
But even if Bhikkhu Anālayo tried to use MN 117 to justify their redefinition of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, disregarding the Abhidhamma origin and lateness of that passage, there is another problem they can not overcome. It's the same fatal flaw as with Vism.
What MN 117, and the Abhidhamma definition says about (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation in jhāna, is not that "placing the mind & keeping it connected" REPLACES the normal definition of thinking & evaluation. It's that thinking & evaluation should INCLUDE a subtler kind of (V&V💭) . It's not REPLACING and getting rid of the standard understanding of (V&V💭).
Vism. pulls the same dirty stunt with breath meditation and kāya (body). What the sutta text actually says for the relevant passage they rely on, is that the breath is INCLUDED as ONE type of body. It's not REPLACING all the other types of bodies with ONLY THAT BREATH BODY. In other words, what the EBT actually says is it's legitimate to focus entirely on just the breath and exclude the physical body AS ONE TYPE among many ways of doing that practice, because the breath is one type of body that meets the requirement of kāya-anupassana practice. It's not saying the previous ways of contemplating body (such as 4 elements) are to be discarded and REPLACED with that new definition.
But because of survivorship bias, over reliance and blind faith on popular teachers, and bandwagon effect, if a wrong view becomes popular, people accept that as gospel and don't even bother to look at what the EBT says.
parable of Sid Gotonirvana's family farm
http://notesonthedhamma.blogspot.com/2019/02/parable-of-sid-gotonirvanas-family-farm.html
also included under 4nt → 8 → wrong jhana, wrong samadhi
MN 19, 78, 125: first jhāna omitted
MA 102, || to MN 19 agama parallel skips first jhana
MN 19 has first jhana
MN 19 || omits first jhana
MN 78 omits first jhana (V&V)
MN 78 || omits first jhana (V&V)
MN 125 omits first jhana
MN 125 || has first jhana
MN 78 is the "tie breaker", both versions skip first jhana
MN 19 || omits first jhana like MN 125
From Ven. Analayo’s footnotes in MA studies.
40 [49] A complementary case occurs in MN 19 at MN I 117,6 and its parallel MĀ
102 at T I 589c10, where the Chinese version omits the first absorption and
proceeds directly from overcoming wholesome thoughts to the second absorp
tion, whereas the Pāli version does take the first absorption into account.
41
savitakka the expression 有覺
45 Descriptions of the first absorption in each of the four main Chinese Āgamas
have as their counterpart to savitakka the expression 有覺; cf. DĀ 9 at T I
50c19 (parallel to DN 33 at DN III 222,5); MĀ 2 at T I 422b12 (parallel to AN
7.65 at AN IV 118,21); SĀ 483 at T II 123b1 (parallel to SN 36.29 at SN IV
236,3); and EĀ 31.1 at T II 666b13 (parallel to MN 4 at MN I 21,35). Hirakawa 1997: 1062 lists √budh, √jñā and √vid for 覺, which Soothill 1937/2000:
480 translates as “to awake, apprehend, perceive, realize” and also as to be
“aware”. The term 觀 as an equivalent to vicāra usually renders terms related
to √paś in the Madhyama-āgama, such as, e.g., vipaśyanā or anupaśyanā,
“insight” or “contemplation”.
footnote on difference between vitakka inside first jhana and not in jhana
46 Thus, e.g., MĀ 102 at T I 589c9 uses 覺 in the context of absorption, but in
the same line of the text employs 念 to refer to “thoughts”, both occurrences
paralleling the use of the same word vitakka in its parallel MN 19 at MN I
116,35 and 117,7. The use of these different renderings does convey the impression that the translator(s) were aware of the difference between these two
types of vitakka and endeavoured to render them in such a way that they would
not be confused with each other.
What B.Analayo says about V&V in MN 19, 78, 125
2009 Bhikkhu Anālayo's (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra enclopedia entry:
In fact, according to the (MN 78) Samanamandikii Sutta, the
complete
cessation of unwholesome thoughts and
intentions can be achieved by attaining the first jhana.
This points to the contribution that the development
of samatha has to offer in relation to overcoming
unwholesome thoughts. A meditation practice
explicitly recommended forgoing beyond thought is
mindfulness of breathing (Ud. 37).
Vitakka and Jhana
The Dvedhavitakka Sutta (MN 19) indicates that even
though thoughts related to renunciation, non ill-will
and harmlessness are entirely wholesome, yet,
excessive thinking will tire the mind and not lead to
concentration. Hence at some point even
wholesome
thoughts need to be left behind in order to steady the
mind and lead it to deeper concentration (MN 19) (M I. 116).
However, though deeper stages of concentration will
lead beyond thoughts, this does not mean that vitakka
has no place at all in the context of early Buddhist
meditation. In fact, reflective types of meditation are
described in the discourses and in later literature.
involving various recollections, anussati. These can
take the Buddha, his teachings or the community as
their object, or else one's own virtue or generosity, or
heavenly beings ( A. III,312).
When I first read this section, I was stunned. He ignores MN 125 in this section, and perhaps the entire encyclopedia entry.
But even just looking at MN 19 and MN 78, there’s enough information there that’s impossible to miss, impossible to ignore.
He cites MN 78, so we know he knows about it, and he’s even translated the MN 78 Chinese parallel in his MA studies.
The crucial part of MN 78 states the 3 skillful thoughts (sankappa/vitakka) don’t cease until
second jhana.
That crucial part is incontrovertible evidence that shows V&V does not change in nature before, and during first jhana.
And that is just two sentences away from the part he cited about unwholesome thoughts ceasing in first jhana.
Impossible to miss that. Unless he was grossly negligent.
I was shocked, stunned, and depressed when I read this because the horror dawned on me that a highly regarded academic scholar and meditation monk, vowed to a life of integrity and honesty, was intentionally being deceptive and intellectually dishonest. It’s only because of the technical nature of the topic that most people will not see and understand the deception.
It’s as close as you can come to an outright lie without technically being a lie.
He was either being negligent, incompetent, or intellectually dishonest.
We can rule out the first two, because if it was an honest mistake, you would expect he’d have published an amendment and fixed it.
Perhaps his omission of MN 125 was an honest oversight in this encyclopedia entry, but with his publication of EBMS dated 2017,
With his comparative MN and MA studies, and his attempt to dismiss the validity of those suttas by his dubious theory of possible transmission error, we can safely conclude this is intellectual dishonesty to the highest degree.
2017 B. Analayo’s EBMS Absorption (p. 125)
In sum, to take these two discourses (MN 19 & MN 125 & their Chinese parallels) as canonical support for
assuming that the first absorption is comparable to ordinary
thinking activity is doubtful, as the apparent progression from
such an ordinary state of mind directly to the second absorption,
without ever having experienced the first absorption, could just
be the result of a transmission error
We’re going to come back to his 2017 treatment in just a short while.
First, let’s see what he said about these 3 suttas (and their 3 parallels) between 2009 and 2017.
MN 78 compstudy vol.1 2011
(MN 78: in 2011 B.Analayo knows where 'wholesome thoughts' cease)
MN II 27 With their examination of conduct completed, the two versions turn to thoughts or intentions, whose arising they attribute to perception. According to both versions, unwholesome thoughts or intentions cease with the first jhāna. In relation to the cessation
of wholesome thoughts or intentions, the Majjhima-nikāya account attributes such cessation to the second jhāna, whereas its Madhyama-āgama parallel speaks of the fourth
jhāna instead. (180)
(180) MN 78 at MN II 28,22 and MĀ 179 at T I 721b17. In relation to this difference, it is noteworthy that the
standard description of the jhānas in the Pāli and Chinese discourses presents the removal of initial and
sustained mental application as the decisive precondition for entering the second jhāna. Thus, although
wholesome thoughts and intentions will certainly have ceased with the fourth jhāna, the same already
takes place as soon as the second jhāna has been attained, so that the presentation in MN 78 appears to
be more to the point.
...
In fact, a closer inspection of the (MN 78) Sama+ama+:ikā-sutta suggests the commentarial
explanation to be unconvincing. According to the exposition given in the discourse itself, the cessation of unwholesome intentions takes place with the first jhāna, and the
cessation of wholesome intentions with the second jhāna.
MN 125 compstudy vol.2 2011
The two versions continue with the attainment of the four jhānas. While the Majjhima-nikāya discourse directly approaches the second jhāna, without mentioning the first
jhāna,(172) the Madhyama-āgama version takes the first jhāna into account (see above
table 13.4). (173)
In relation to this difference, it strikes an unfamiliar note when the Dantabhūmi-sutta
presents a progression of practice that leads from satipa""hāna meditation directly to
the second jhāna, without prior attainment of the first jhāna. Although satipa""hāna can
serve as a foundation for the development of the jhānas, (174) in itself it does not constitute a form of jhāna practice. Perhaps the occurrence of the word vitakka in the passage
on satipa""hāna without thought has led to a lapse on the part of the reciter(s) of the
discourse, who continued straight away with the calming of vitakka (vitakka-vicārā-
na vūpasamā), mentioned at the outset of the second jhāna formula, thereby unintentionally dropping the first jhāna in between.175
172 MN 125 at MN III 136,26. Notably, Ee also does not mention the fourth jhāna, although the same is
found in Be-MN III 175,25, Ce-MN III 316,20, and Se-MN III 269,20.
173 MĀ 198 at T I 758b25.
174 The foundational role of satipa""hāna for deeper levels of concentration can be seen, e.g., in DN 18 at
DN II 216,12, SN 52:6 at SN V 299,19, and SN 52:11-24 at SN V 303-305.
175 For a similar case cf. above p. 140; cf. also Anālayo 2012d.
MN 19 compstudy vol.1 2011
Becoming concentrated in this way leads in both versions to the attainment of the four
jhānas. While in the Dvedhāvitakka-sutta the attainment of the jhānas is still part of the
future Buddha’s own pre-awakening development,198 in its Madhyama-āgama parallel
the subject of the sentence changes from the Buddha to a monk in general, who by overcoming wholesome thoughts will be able to attain the jhānas.199 Another difference in
relation to the same statement is that the Chinese version proceeds directly from leaving
behind wholesome thoughts to the attainment of the second jhāna, while the Pāli
version includes the first jhāna in its account.200 The Dvedhāvitakka-sutta continues after the four jhānas with the attainment of the three higher knowledges. The Madhyama-
āgama parallel, however, mentions only the third of these, the destruction of the influxes.201
199 MĀ 102 at T I 589c7: 若比丘 ... 得第二禪成就遊 ... 得第四禪成就遊.
200 A similar absence of the first jhāna can be found in MN 125 at MN III 136,27, which proceeds directly
from overcoming thoughts to the second jhāna. In this case, however, the parallel MĀ 198 at T I 758b26
does refer to the first jhāna. Notably, in the case of MN 125 and MĀ 198 as well as in the present case
of MN 19 and MĀ 102, the jhāna treatments are preceded by a reference to leaving behind thinking.
This suggests that the omission of the first jhāna in MN 125 and in MĀ 102 may be a transmission
error that happened during oral recitation, where the circumstance that a leaving behind of “thought”
(vitakka) has just been mentioned may have misled the reciter(s) to continue with the standard formulation of the second jhāna, which mentions such leaving behind of vitakka, thereby unintentionally
omitting to recite the first jhāna; cf. also Anālayo 2012d
MN 19, 78, 125 final score: 🔪 Occam's razor six, Bhikkhu Anālayo zero
There is no way Bhikkhu Anālayo could have forgotten about MN 78 between 2009 and his EBMS book in 2017.
There is also the fact that he translated, from Chinese, the MN 78 parallel,
as well as two different chinese EBT lineage versions for the parallel to MN 10 satipaṭṭhāna.
The (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation controversy is a big deal, and the key suttas are well understood by all sides. Even if he didn't personally make the logical deduction initially that "wholesome thoughts ceasing in second jhāna" means that wholesome thoughts are still operational in first jhāna, someone would have told him.
What he's trying to do here, in his analaysis of MN 19, 78, 125, is reframe the narrative.
First, pretend to forget about MN 78 and its parallel, both of which provide incontrovertible evidence against his position, to make odds appear more favorable.
With the field reduced down to 4 suttas (MN 19, MN 125, and their parallels), he tries to sell us on his narrative fallacy of "perhaps MN 19 and MN 125 omitted first jhāna (V&V💭) because of faulty oral transmission." Most people would probably think it's kind of a 50/50 proposition, a fifty percent chance there was faulty oral transmission.
Recall the conjunction fallacy. Even if we were to play by his dishonest rules reframing the game, and assume there's kind of a 50% chance there was oral transmission error in either EBT lineage, the chance that both of them made a transmission error, by Bayes theorem in conditional probability, is 0.5 multiplied by 0.5, or one out of four chance, 25% chance for his preferred scenario of both sides having a transmission error.
In other words, even in Bhikkhu Anālayo's crooked dice game, there's still a 75% chance one of the lineage was not a transmission error, and the final vote count would favor the EBT position, not Bhikkhu Anālayo's (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation redefinition.
These probabilities here are not to give realistic probabilities, but just to give a very rough idea of how unrealistic and ridiculous his far fetched hypothesis fallacy proposal really is. The moral of the story is that with good story telling skills, the right amount of intellectual dishonesty, a biased agenda, a good narrative fallacy and conjunction fallacy, you can spin a tale that seems plausible. It's how high powered attorneys make the big bucks, how politicians cheat their constiutuents and how organized religion can easily manipulate their followers.
Now if we bring MN 78 and its parallel back into the picture, and even if we indulge in Bhikkhu Anālayo's fantasy of oral transmission error, it's a landslide victory for EBT and a loss for Bhikkhu Anālayo.
In fact even if we play his crooked game and leave out MN 78 and assume transmission error in both lineages, evidence is still in favor of EBT. The EBT interpretation of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra, directed-thought & evaluation works whether first jhāna formula is there or not. But the absence of first jhāna makes it an airtight case AGAINST Bhikkhu Anālayo and VRJ (Vism. Re-definition of Jhāna), because they need the first jhāna there for that little bit of wiggle room to try to posit the existence of a different type of (V&V💭) vitakka & vicāra that exists only in first jhāna.
MN 19 but wait, there’s more fallacies
Even if we play his crooked game, and grant his assumptions, there are still many fallacies in his argument. I don’t have time and interest to address them all, but this is an important one.
From his MN 19 and parallel 2011 comments and footnotes, he says one overcomes wholesome thinking and “Chinese version proceeds directly from leaving
behind wholesome thoughts to the attainment of the second jhāna,”. That is hideously wrong. Here’s what MN 19 actually says. If you think too intensely or indulge in too much wholesome thinking, it will make your body tired, thereby blocking kāya-passadhi-sambojjhanga (bodily pacification awakening factor), and blocking the samadhi sambojjhanga and first jhana from happening. Between the passage I quote below, and the appearance of first jhana formula, nothing else is said about vitakka. It doesn’t get abandoned, it becomes more calm and gentle.
| |
|
Rattin-divaṃ cepi naṃ, bhikkhave, |
even for a day & night, |
anu-vitakkeyyaṃ anu-vicāreyyaṃ, |
(if I should) excessively-think (and) excessively-ponder, |
neva tatonidānaṃ bhayaṃ samanupassāmi. |
I do not envision any danger that would come from it, |
api ca kho me aticiraṃ anu-vitakkayato anu-vicārayato |
except that thinking & pondering a long time |
kāyo kilameyya. |
would tire the body. |
kāye kilante VAR cittaṃ ūhaññeyya. |
When the body is tired, the mind is disturbed; |
ūhate citte ārā cittaṃ samādhimhāti. |
(and a) disturbed mind (is) far (from a) mind (in) undistractable-lucidity.’ |
| |
|
(code phrase for “attempt 4 jhānas”)
| |
|
so kho ahaṃ, bhikkhave, |
So I, |
ajjhattameva cittaṃ |
internally (my) mind |
saṇṭhapemi sannisādemi |
steadied (and) settled, |
ekodiṃ karomi VAR |
unified (I) made (it), |
samādahāmi. |
(I made it) undistractable-&-lucid. |
taṃ kissa hetu? |
Why is that? |
‘mā me cittaṃ ūhaññī’ti VAR. |
So that my mind would not be disturbed. |
MN 125 is also very explicit, not leaving any wiggle room about what the nature of vitakka is in first jhana. 5Niv (hindrances) already abandoned with S&S in previous stage, first jhana formula omitted, and what appears in the place that first jhana would have occupied is more S&S, with Dhamma vitakka, thoughts connected to dhamma and S&S.
| |
|
kāmūpasaṃhitaṃ vitakkaṃ vitakkesī’ |
but don’t think thoughts connected with sensual pleasures |
It’s astounding that when the Buddha makes such clear, explicit, concise explanations of the exact nature of V&V in first jhana like this, intellectually dishonest people with a biased agenda will still try to use sophistry and fallacy to read in absurd interpretations.
☸ MN 19, 78, 125 final score: 🔪 Occam's razor six, Bhikkhu Anālayo zero
Does ‘Impossible’ mean what I think it means?
SN 36.11 He says speaking in first jhāna is ‘impossible’
2009 Bhikkhu Anālayo's (V&V💭) enclopedia:
Elsewhere the discourses indicate
that
during the first jhāna it is impossible to speak (SN 36.11) (S.
IV. 217). and the
hearing of sounds is an obstruction
to its attainment (A. V, 135). With the first jhāna one
has gone beyond Mara's vision (A/. 1. 159). having
reached the end of the world of the senses (A. IV. 430).
Though these passages present the first jhāna as a
deeply concentrated state of mental absorption, the
mental factors required for its attainment include,
according to the standard description, vitakka and
vicira. These two are only left behind with the
attainment of the second jhāna. 3 To understand the
jhāna factor vitakka here as referring to conceptual
thought conflicts with the descriptions of the first
jhāna given in the above passages, which make it clear
that the first jhāna is something far deeper than the
type of mental condition in which conceptual thought
and reflection take place.
Let’s see what the sutta actually says.
SN 36.11
(in 4 jhānas one can perceive rūpa ✅ 🚶)
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|
1. paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa |
1. (with) first jhāna attained, |
🚫🗣️💬 vācā niruddhā hoti. |
🚫🗣️💬 vocalization-of-speech has ceased. |
2. dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa |
2. (with) second jhāna attained, |
🚫(V&V💭) vitakka-vicārā niruddhā honti. |
🚫(V&V💭) directed-thought-&-evaluation has ceased. |
3. tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa |
3. (with) third jhāna attained, |
🚫😁 pīti niruddhā hoti. |
🚫😁 rapture has ceased. |
4. catutthaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa |
4. (with) fourth jhāna attained, |
🚫🌬️😤 assāsa-passāsā niruddhā honti. |
🚫🌬️😤 in-breath-out-breath has ceased. |
(in a-rūpa / form-less attainments, body 🚶 perception disappears)
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5. ākāsā-nañc-āyatanaṃ samāpannassa |
5. (with) space-infinitude-dimension attained, |
🚫🚶 rūpa-saññā niruddhā hoti. |
🚫🚶 forms-perception has ceased. |
What the sutta actually says is if you vocalize speech in first jhana,
then you cease to be in first jhana.
It most definitely does not say speech is impossible to do from jhana.
Just as it’s not impossible to think while in second jhana.
If you think while you’re in second jhana,
then you cease to be in second jhana.
See ☸4nt → 8aam #8: Sammā Samādhi 🌄 → impure jhāna
suttas such as SN 40.1-9, SN 21.1, AN 9.34, AN 9.41, jhana can be interrupted by impurities.
another prime example, Vinaya Parjika 4.1 Moggallana hears sound in imperturbable samadhi.
What B.Analayo is trying to do, by claiming in first jhana it’s impossible to speak,
to justify that first jhana is so ‘deep’ that normal thinking as ‘vitakka’ would not be possible.
This is confirmation bias. He needs jhana to be deep, so he manufactures ‘evidence’ to support the conclusion he wants to prove, by misinterpreting SN 36.11 to mean “speech is impossible.”
V&V, Analayo's misunderstanding of noble silence
Analayo EBMS 2017 pg 126
(Early Buddhist Meditation Studies)
Another indication relevant to the present theme is that the
second absorption constitutes a noble type of silence.35 Since
speech has ceased before the attainment of the first absorption,36the reference to “silence” here cannot mean that only with the
second absorption one stops speaking (I return below to the
question of hearing sound while being in the second absorption). The point behind the idea of a “noble silence” would
rather reflect that with the attainment of the second absorption,
the mental factors vitakka and vicāra (application) have been
left behind. These two are elsewhere qualified as verbal formations,37 since they are required for being able to speak. However, the same two mental factors of vitakka and vicāra can
also be employed in a way that does not involve breaking into
speech, merely standing for a directing of the mind toward a
theme or object and sustaining it there. ――――――
so vivicc' eva kāmehi, etc. On repetition as a central characteristic
of the early Buddhist texts, see e.g. von Simson 1965: 5ff, Allon
1997: 273ff, Weeratunge 2004, Anālayo 2007: 8ff, and Gethin 2007.
35 SN 21.1 at SN II 273,14: dutiyaṃ jhānam upasampajja viharati,
ayaṃ vuccati ariyo tuṇhībhāvoti, and its parallel SĀ 501 at T II
132a19: 第二禪具足住, 是名聖默然.
36 SN 36.11 at SN IV 217,5: pathamaṃ jhānaṃ (Be and Ce: paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ, Se: paṭhamajjhānaṃ) samāpannassa vācā niruddhā
hoti and its parallel SĀ 474 at T II 121b2: 初禪正受時, 言語寂滅.
37 SN 41.6 at SN IV 293,15: vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro and its parallel SĀ 568 at T II 150a24: 有覺, 有觀, 名為口行. Another occurrence of this definition in MN 44 at MN I 301,21 has a similarly
worded Tibetan counterpart in D 4094 ju 8a5 or Q 5595 tu 9a5:rtog pa dang dpyod pa ni ngag gi ’du byed ces bya’o.
Two big problems with his analaysis.
1. Fallacious reasoning: "However, the same two mental factors of vitakka and vicāra can
also be employed in a way that does not involve breaking into
speech, merely standing for a directing of the mind toward a
theme or object and sustaining it there."
vaci-sankhara = vocalization-co-doing
(Analayo: verbal-formation). Actions that are essential to the process of vocalizing speech out loud.
Vaci-sankhara is communicable, coherent, un-vocalized verbal activity, meant to be broadcast, received and heard by listeners. If you're only directing your mind toward a theme and silently sustaining it there, it's a mentally silent activity, with no coherent idea or thoughts to broadcast to a listener.
example: mentally reciting some Dhamma you’ve memorized, is like chanting it in your mind without making a sound. You can even move your lips, as long as you don’t emit sound.
The fallacies involved here are false equivalence, biased sample.
He doesn't dispute the nature of vaci-sankhara, "verbal formations", needing to be communicable speech in unspoken form.
The fallacy, is that he claims that since "directing & sustaining" are a subset of the required actions for vaci-sankhara to happen, therefore it satisfies the criteria for it. That's a type of false equivalence fallacy. For example, if you go to a store to buy a horse-and-carriage, you pay for it and they give you only a horse without a carriage. A horse does not equal a horse-and-carriage, and is unable to perform all the functions you need.
Revisiting the example of chanting Dhamma mentally versus vocalizing it out loud: With the proper definition of V&V = directed-thought and evaluation, you would then chant Dhamma out loud that other people can listen to and comprehend. If you used the wrong V&V of Analayo, your mind would just be directed to with sustained attention on an unmoving preverbal thought, and you would not be able to speak anything intelligible.
2. B.Analayo doesn't follow the implications of his redefinition.
If you redefine V&V (the activity of first jhana) to be "directing the mind and sustaining it on an object", then first jhana would be noble silence, not second jhana! The fact that Buddha sets the bar at second jhana is incontrovertible evidence that the
✅ V&V of first jhana must be verbal thinking and reflection!
See ☸4nt → 8aam #8: Sammā Samādhi 🌄 → STED (smd 2) 🌗 dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ: Second Jhāna, ariyo vā tuṇhī-bhāvo (noble ☸ silence 😶)
for pali+english audit of every sutta passage that mentions noble silence.
bonus fallacy: bait & switch
This is used frequently, not just by B. Analayo, but by anyone trying to sell a fallacy, or any skilled salesman trying to sell product.
You can see it in action here. Before he hits you with the fallacy, first he sets you up with several true, logical statements, some of which are simply restating what the sutta says in his own words.
But to be fair, it’s possible in this case of noble silence, he just genuinely misunderstands how it works and what the implications are. In many of the other cases, the audit trail he left behind leaves no doubt as to his intentions.
This is where credit history comes in. Does a person have a history of being honest and behaving with integrity?
Hearing sounds in jhāna, samādhi
EBMS p. 142
Now to attain the second absorption one needs to overcome
vitakka and vicāra, application and its sustaining, and to attain
the third absorption it is necessary to leave behind joy (pīti). In
fact a recurrence of these factors implies that the respective level
of absorption has been lost. It follows that from the perspective of these two discourses proper attainment of the first absorption requires leaving behind the hearing of sound.71
Moggallana hears sounds in imperturbable samādhi
Bhikkhu Anālayo’s analysis on Moggallana hearing sounds in imperturbable (anenja) attainment is seriously flawed.
anenja is ambiguous.
It usually means the formless attainments,
but it can also refer to fourth jhāna.
It's only by context we can make an educated guess whether it means
1) only formless atainments
2) only 4th jhāna
3) both 1) and 2)
Bhikkhu Anālayo does dutifully acknowledge the possibility of the 3rd option,
but he doesn't make full disclosure and justify this important assumption,
like an objective person should do.
Here's the reason that's important.
The Theravada EBT is unambiguous about the formless attainments, having transcended form (the body sensations, ability to hear, see, smell etc.), one is not able to hear sounds.
For example, in Theravada EBT
MN 43 mind divorced from 5 body faculties can know the first three formless attainments.
AN 9.37 mind divorced from 5 body faculties stated different way
(What is one percipient of when divorced from 5 sense faculties?)
Answer is same 3 formless attainments as MN 43, plus na ca sa-saṅkhāra-niggayha-vārita-gato
The Theravada vinaya and commentaries, and the other EBT vinayas, seem to be in agreement on formless attainments, are only pure if they can't hear sounds.
This being the case, by deduction it's almost for certain Moggallana's imperturbable samādhi is referring to case (1), only formless attainments.
If you examine all the passages where case (2), only 4th jhāna, is meant by 'imperturbable', most famously the often occurring pericope of the purifed fourth jhāna. With bright workable mind, which can easily access the supernormal powers, divine ear, etc, obviously if you can levitate, hear sounds from miles away, from other worlds and any distance, then you're not in a state where you can't hear sounds.
So given those constraints, you could deduce with 99% certainty that the vinaya passage with Moggallana must be referring to formless attainments. We can't be 100% sure, but if you're going to argue for case (3) then you have a duty to disclose you're making an unlikely assumption and why you are doing that.
Bhikkhu Anālayo conveniently avoids mentioning all of this. Why? Confirmation bias most likely. You want to prove you can't hear sounds in the four jhānas, so you manufacture evidence, cherry pick passages, then use a biased sample fallacy to support your cause. But is it possible he just didn't do his homework and think things through?
Let's look at the conclusion he arrives at. Bhikkhu Anālayo concludes Moggallana was in fourth jhāna, and therefore since he heard sounds while in fourth jhāna, and the Buddha called it 'impure', then a proper fourth jhāna means you can't hear sounds.
cherry picking the four jhānas
Now that he's "proven" that in a proper fourth jhāna, one can't hear sounds,
he then sets out to cherry pick passages between Agamas and Theravada to prove that in a purifed, proper version of the second and third jhānas, one can't hear sounds.
Since I don't read Chinese, I wouldn't be able to do a proper analysis on the feasibility of his arguments.
But if we restrict our discussion to just Theravada,
I've done a detailed study of this in a separate article here, with pāḷi+english audit.
Also included in that same article is Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's excellent essay on the same subject, "silence is not mandatory".
See ☸4nt → 8aam #8: Sammā Samādhi 🌄 →You can hear sounds in the 4 jhānas.
for detailed sutta references and explanation.
The sutta he uses to claim one can not hear in jhana, AN 10.72, if one objectively interprets it:
" Is the thorn an irritator, preventor, or destroyer?
For those who subscribe to the view that jhāna is VRJ (Visuddhimagga Redefinition of Jhāna), then the 10 thorn similes used in the sutta is quite puzzling and incoherent. For if sound is a thorn that prevents first jhāna, the other 9 thorns must “prevent” the activity being stated. But if you work through the list and try it out, it’s logically incoherent and impossible. It only works for first jhana, 2nd, 3rd, and fourth jhana. You run into the same kind of logical incoherence and impossibility if you treat the thorn as a “destroyer” of that attainment/activity. Only treating the sound as “an irritator” while one is in the moment to moment active process of doing that activity, does the thorn simile make sense logically and coherently for all 10 similes."
Once again, this is confirmation bias. He needs jhana to be deep, so he manufactures ‘evidence’ to support the conclusion he wants to prove, by misinterpreting AN 10.72 to mean “you can’t hear sounds in jhana.”
B. Analayo claims you can not do jhāna while in satipatthāna
In EBT, you CAN do jhāna while in satipatthāna
MN 125 compstudy vol.2 2011
although satipatthāna can
serve as a foundation for the development of the jhānas, (174) in itself it does not constitute a form of jhāna practice.
In MN 125, B.Analayo tries to explain away the missing first jhana, by claiming that one can't do satipatthana and jhana simultaneously.
Yet, from his own published satipatthana studies, it explicitly says you can do jhana and satipatthana simultaneously.
MN 10 parallel in Ekottarika-āgama dhamma anupasssana
(excerpt from Analayo's SP perspectives)
The Ekottarika-āgama account of contemplation of dharmas includes the attainment of the four absorptions in its description of contemplation of dharmas. The instructions present the standard description of the attainment of the four absorptions, each time followed by the suggestion that this would be a form of satipaṭṭhāna practice. The full passage reads as follows:
Again, free from craving for sensual pleasures, removing evil and unwholesome states, with [directed] awareness and [sustained] contemplation, being tranquil and mindful … one enjoys the first absorption and experiences joy in oneself. In this way, [in regard to] dharmas … one contemplates the characteristics of dharmas as a satipaṭṭhāna.
Again, discarding [directed] awareness and [sustained] contem plation, arousing joy within, the mind being unified, without [directed] awareness or [sustained] contemplation, being mindful and tranquil, with joy and at ease … one dwells in the second absorption and experiences joy in oneself. In this way, [in regard] to dharmas … one contemplates the characteristics of dharmas as a satipaṭṭhāna.
Again, mindfully discarding [joy] … one cultivates equanimity in this respect, one constantly knows and experiences pleasant feelings oneself with the body, as sought after by noble ones, with purity of equanimity and mindfulness,1 one engages in the third absorption. In this way, [in regard to] dharmas … one contemplates the characteristics of dharmas as a satipaṭṭhāna.
Again, discarding mental states of pain and pleasure and also being without sadness and joy, without pain and without pleasure, with purity of equanimity and mindfulness … one enjoys the fourth absorption. In this way, [in regard to] dharmas … one contemplates the characteristics of dharmas as a satipaṭṭhāna.
And if that’s not enough to convince you, here’s his translation of the MA parallel, so now we have two other EBT lineages where you can do jhāna while in satipatthana, explicitly saying so in their parallel to MN “the satipatthana sutta”.
MA || MN 10
XIII.2 MADHYAMA-ĀGAMA
THE DISCOURSE ON SATIPAṬṬHĀNA
(this list is frank’s comments comparing differences with MN 10, B.Analayo’s translation follows)
MA version of MN 10
kaya anupassana
posture awareness
sati and sampajano
this part unusual, is one of the 5 methods of stopping thinking in MN 20
again, another method from MN 20
first 4 steps in 16 APS anapana, no simile unlike MN 10
4 jhana similes, not in MN 10, but in MN 119 kayagata
perception of light, not in MN 10 nor MN 119
31 body parts, with simile, same as MN 10
4 elements, and simile, same as MN 10
9 cemetary contemplations
vedana anupassana, quite different than MN 10
citta anupassana essentially identical with MN 10
dhamma anupassana
6 sense bases, nearly identical with MN 10
5niv, hindrances, nearly identical with MN 10
7sb section indentical with MN 10
conclusion
( 4 jhana similes, not in MN 10, but in MN 119 kayagata)
“Again a monk contemplates the body as a body: a monk completely drenches and pervades his body with joy and happiness born of seclusion [experienced in the first absorption], so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by joy and happiness born of seclusion.
“It is just as a bath attendant who, having filled a vessel with bathing powder, mixes it with water and kneads it, so that there is no part [of the powder] that is not completely drenched and pervaded with water.
“In the same way a monk completely drenches and pervades his body with joy and happiness born of seclusion, so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by joy and happiness born of seclusion.
“In this way a monk contemplates the body as a body internally and contemplates the body as a body externally. He establishes mindfulness in the body and is endowed with knowledge, vision, understanding, and penetration. This is reckoned how a monk contemplates the body as a body.
“Again a monk contemplates the body as a body: a monk completely drenches and pervades his body with joy and happiness born of concentration [experienced in the second absorption], so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by joy and happiness born of concentration.
“It is just as a mountain spring that is full and overflowing with clear and clean water, [583a] so that water coming from any of the four directions cannot enter it, with the spring water welling up from the bottom on its own, flowing out and flooding the surroundings, completely drenching every part of the mountain so that there is no part that is not pervaded by it.
“In the same way a monk completely drenches and pervades his body with joy and happiness born of concentration so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by joy and happiness born of concentration.
“In this way a monk contemplates the body as a body internally and contemplates the body as a body externally. He establishes mindfulness in the body and is endowed with knowledge, vision, understanding, and penetration. This is reckoned how a monk contemplates the body as a body.
“Again a monk contemplates the body as a body: a monk completely drenches and pervades his body with happiness born of the absence of joy [experienced in the third absorption], so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by happiness born of the absence of joy.
“It is just as a blue, red, or white lotus, being born in the water and having come to growth in the water, remains submerged in water, with every part of its roots, stem, flower, and leaves completely drenched and pervaded [by water], so that there is no part that is not pervaded by it.
“In the same way a monk completely drenches and pervades his body with happiness born of the absence of joy so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by happiness born of the absence of joy.
“In this way a monk contemplates the body as a body internally and contemplates the body as a body externally. He establishes mindfulness in the body and is endowed with knowledge, vision, understanding, and penetration. This is reckoned how a monk contemplates the body as a body.
“Again a monk contemplates the body as a body: a monk mentally resolves to dwell having accomplished a complete pervasion of his body with mental purity [experienced in the fourth absorption], so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by mental purity.
“It is just as a man who covers himself from head to foot with a cloth measuring seven or eight units, so that no part of his body is not covered.
“In the same way a monk completely pervades his body with mental purity [experienced in the fourth absorption], so that there is no part within his body that is not pervaded by mental purity.
“In this way a monk contemplates the body as a body internally and contemplates the body as a body externally. He establishes mindfulness in the body and is endowed with knowledge, vision, understanding, and penetration. This is reckoned how a monk contemplates the body as a body.
(perception of light, not in MN 10 nor MN 119)
“Again a monk contemplates the body as a body: a monk is mindful of the perception of light, properly taking hold of it, properly retaining it, and properly recollecting what he is mindful of, [so that] what is behind is like what is in front, what is in front is like what is behind, night is like day, day is like night, what is above is like what is below, and what is below is like what is above. In this way he cultivates an undistorted and undefiled mind, a mind that is bright and clear, a mind that is not at all obscured by impediments.
“In this way a monk contemplates the body as a body internally and contemplates the body as a body externally. He establishes mindfulness in the body and is endowed with knowledge, vision, understanding, and penetration. This is reckoned how a monk contemplates the body as a body.
(reviewing sign)
“Again a monk contemplates the body as a body: a monk properly holds [in mind] the reviewing sign, recollecting properly what he is mindful of.
“It is just as a person who is seated and contemplates another person who is lying down, [583b] or while lying down contemplates another person who is seated. In the same way a monk properly holds [in mind] the reviewing sign, recollecting properly what he is mindful of.
“In this way a monk contemplates the body as a body internally and contemplates the body as a body externally. He establishes mindfulness in the body and is endowed with knowledge, vision, understanding, and penetration. This is reckoned how a monk contemplates the body as a body.
Does Bhikkhu Anālayo even read his own translations?
Even if we restrict our samples to within Theravada, it’s clear and unambiguous satipaṭṭhāna and jhāna are done simultaneously. Just a few examples:
1) Start with the 3rd jhāna formula. Sato ca sampajano: satipaṭṭhāna instructions are explicitly embedded right into the third jhāna.
2) MN 122 sannisīdati ekodi hoti samādhiyati = do 4 jhānas
3) With MN 122 passage in mind, now read MN 119 carefully. It's the same set of exercises as MN 10 satipaṭṭhāna, but instead of the sati refrain after each exercise, it has the samādhi jhāna refrain from MN 122. And in addition to the MN 10 kayanupassana exercises, it adds the 4 jhānas and 4 jhāna similes! Essentially, if you were to plug MN 119 back into kayanupassana of MN 10, you'd get something very similar to the MA parallel to MN 10.
There are lots more examples.
See article ☸4nt → 8aam #8🌄: Jhāna is satipaṭṭhāna, and satipaṭṭhāna is Jhāna
Conclusion: That's at least 3 EBT schools all clearly saying the same thing,
Jhāna is satipaṭṭhāna, and satipaṭṭhāna is Jhāna